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This paper explores the relationship between optimal leverage and credit risk under owner-
ship links. It develops a structural model of a parent and a subsidiary, which issues debt in
its own name under a guarantee by the parent. We ￿nd that zero leverage can be optimal
for the guarantor, while leverage close to one can be optimal for the guaranteed company,
as this optimally exploits the tax shield of debt while minimizing default costs. As far as
credit risk is considered, their joint default probability is lower than that of stand alone
units, despite their higher debt capacity. Higher group optimal leverage and lower default
probability increase value with respect to conglomerate mergers and stand alone arrange-
ments. Default probability, spreads and loss given default of the subsidiary are higher than
for a stand alone with similar size and volatility.
We also study the situation when the subsidiary is constrained to a debt equal to the
optimal stand alone level. Only in this case group credit risk depends on the ownership
share.
Consistently with intuition, our unconstrained model rationalizes the capital structure
typical of private equity; the constrained model instead is able to explain observed features
of public business groups and more regulated environments.
Keywords: credit risk, default risk, structural models, optimal leverage, zero leverage,
ownership structure, parent-subsidiary.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: G32, G33, G341 Introduction
Structural models of credit risk consider a company as a stand-alone unit. However, com-
panies often own - at least partially - a subsidiary unit, which issues debt in its own name.
These parent-subsidiary links characterize private equity arrangements and LBOs, as well
joint ventures, project ￿nancing and traditional business groups. A considerable amount
of empirical works investigates the leverage of these organizations, being them private or
public, but no research model explains it. This paper takes a step in this direction.
The parent-subsidiary link may imply very di⁄erent relationships depending on legal
covenants, informal support agreements, ownership levels and shared names (Samson, 2001).
At one extreme, the two ￿rms can be treated like an integrated business. This is the case
when either the subsidiary is fully owned, or when there is a legally binding guarantee issued
by the parent. In such instances there is no di⁄erence between parent and subsidiary debt,
because the parent is fully responsible for its subsidiary. At the other extreme the subsidiary
is run independently, and the parent - which is totally unresponsible for its subsidiary￿ s debt
obligations -only receives dividends. These two cases respectively resemble the conglomerate
merger and the stand-alone units which are analyzed in Leland (2007). We model the in-
between case, where the parent provides support to bail out its insolvent subsidiary when
it can a⁄ord to, but leverage in the two units is determined so as to maximize their joint
value. The parent provides a guarantee, but still enjoys limited liability. As a result, we
can analyze how the intermediate structure a⁄ects default probabilities, recovery rates, the
associated spreads and ratings. We can thus contrast the credit quality of the two extreme
situations with the intermediate one, that we label the group.
Observed parent-subsidiary credit links and the features of the corresponding internal
capital markets, have been studied in a number of empirical papers. They all recognize that
group membership a⁄ects the size, location and default risk of members￿debt obligations
(Emery and Cantor, 2005; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006).
As a whole, cross subsidization seems to exist, but to be conditional on survival of the
parent.
As for existence, Khanna and Palepu (2000) document it in Indian groups, which have
distinguished features of LBOs, such as absence of agency costs. Khanna and Yafeh (2000)
report the existence of liquidity smoothing. Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2004) report the
existence of asset transfers, both in terms of cash or subsidized loans or transfer pricing at
o⁄-market prices, which put in place conditional rescue of one group unit by the other.
As for conditioning, Boot et al. (1993) investigate why parent companies write comfort
letters assuring subsidiaries￿lenders that they would assist them in distress. These are
seemingly useless documents, as they are legally unenforceable. However, precisely this
feature allows parent companies to disregard them ex-post in states when supporting the
insolvent subsidiary would undermine their own integrity. Thus Boot et al. (1993) point
out, as a distinctive feature of groups, that the parent can choose whether to support its
subsidiary or let it selectively default. Jensen (2007) too states that there are limits to the
1cross-subsidization among business units and the waste of free cash ￿ ow.
A paper which documents both cross subsidization and its conditional nature is Emery
and Cantor (2005). The Authors, while recognizing that it is extremely di¢ cult to compile
a database that accounts for cross guarantees and support mechanisms, ￿nd that selective
default occurs quite frequently, especially in ring fenced subsidiaries. Cross guarantees in
these cases are not unconditionally e⁄ective or legally binding.
A few theoretical models build on our assumption that the parent is not legally re-
sponsible for its subsidiary debt obligations1 (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005; Bianco and
Nicodano, 2006). They study how transfers from the parent impact on the spread charged
to a subsidiary from its outside ￿nanciers, when either managerial e⁄ort or investment risk
cannot be observed. Higher credit quality for the subsidiary is associated to either increased
managerial e⁄ort or reduced risk shifting. The common feature of these models is that of
incorporating the agency issues in group structures. Our model starts from the hypothesis
that leverage in parent-subsidiary links can be better explained in a model without agency
costs, such as a structural model. We will add a constraint proxying for agency costs at a
later stage.
Well known models of credit risk - including the ones used in the ￿nancial industry -
adopt a structural view at the multi ￿rm level. However, with the exception of Leland￿ s
conglomerate, they do not explicitly incorporate any consideration of ownership structure,
with associated selective default features. Giesecke (2004) allows for links between default
boundaries, but does not model the ￿rm relationships which justify them: as a consequence,
the drivers and the strength of the link are not incorporated in his model. On the contrary,
we model explicitly ownership, control and intra-group support mechanisms, which, accord-
ing to empirical evidence, are expected to a⁄ect default and credit risk.
A preview of our main results is as follows. Debt ￿nancing - and the associated tax
shield - is larger for group-a¢ liated than for stand alone ￿rms. Despite this, the probability
of joint default for group companies is very low when compared to stand alone units. This
paradox is due to the optimal capital structure of the group, entailing a complete shift of
the debt burden onto the subsidiary: the unlevered parent defaults only when its cash ￿ ow
turns negative. The shift of debt onto the subsidiary optimally exploits the tax shield of
debt while minimizing default costs, as the parent is able to rescue its subsidiary provided
their cash ￿ ows are less than perfectly correlated. Despite such rescues, group a¢ liation
dramatically worsens the credit quality of the subsidiary, with respect to its stand alone
situation. Most of the time, the subsidiary default is selective, in the sense that the parent
survives - a circumstance that is precluded in mergers (Sarig, 1985). In order to prevent a
complete shift of the debt burden on the subsidiary, either external constraints on leverage
or asymmetries between the parent and the subsidiary - such as greater size of the parent
- are needed.
We therefore ￿nd that groups, or the existence of guarantees together with separate
incorporation, rationalize the credit features observed in practice for private equity funds,
LBOs and MBOs and, in particular, the relationship between debt and insolvency which
1This is the case in major jurisdictions, including the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France (Hadden,
1996; Blumberg, 1989).
2uses to be "the least understood aspect of private equity" (Jensen , 2007).
Private equity indeed is characterized by very high leverage at the divisional level and by
rare bankruptcies, even in the presence of leverage up to 95% or higher (Jensen, 1989, 2007).
Kaplan (1989) documents the fact that MBOs and their leverage policies are driven by tax
savings, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) show that, during the eighties, a number of LBOs and
high levered transactions went bankrupt for ￿nancial, not economic reasons: ￿rms in distress
were those unable to repay overwhelming debt, not those with unsuccessful projects and
poor value as going concerns. This is exactly what happens in our unconstrained model,
where extreme subsidiary leverage turns out to be optimal and entails low group default
probability.
At the same time, our uncostrained model, as well as the asymmetric versions of the
unconstrained model, rationalize observed features of traditional business groups, whose
leverage is lower and whose debt is split between parent and subsidiaries. Indeed, exter-
nal constraints on leverage, meant to prevent agency costs or being a result of regulatory
constraints, are expected to a⁄ect more public groups than private ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set up, and three organizational
modes for two activities - stand alone, group and conglomerate. Section 3 analyzes these
cases through a numerical example, so as to understand their properties. Section 4 compares
optimal leverage, default probabilities, recovery rates and credit spreads across the three
modes, for symmetric units, as the correlation between their cash ￿ ows varies. Section 5
extends the analysis to a subsidiary that is not allowed to raise more debt than a stand
alone, for external or regulatory constraints. Section 6 examines the case where units di⁄er
in bankruptcy costs, size and volatility. The last section concludes.
2 The common set up
In this section we review Leland set up and his analysis of stand alone ￿rms. We then extend
it to the group case. We consider a no arbitrage environment with two dates t = f0;Tg.
There are two activities, and each activity i generates a random future operational (net)
cash ￿ ow value Xi at time t = T. Xi is a continuous random variable. The riskfree interest
rate over the time period T is rT. No arbitrage implies that the value of the operational
cash ￿ ow at t = 0 is its discounted expected value:
X0i = (1 + rT)￿1EXi (1)
where EXi is evaluated under the risk neutral measure. The owners can ￿walk away￿from
negative cash ￿ ows thanks to limited liability. Thus the (pre-tax) value of each activity
with limited liability is
H0i = (1 + rT)￿1EX+
i (2)
where X+
i = max(Xi;0); and the pre-tax value of limited liability is
L0i = H0i ￿ X0i ￿ 0 (3)
3Now consider a tax rate on future cash ￿ ows equal to ￿i. The aftertax value of each
unlevered activity is
V0i = (1 ￿ ￿i)H0i (4)
and the present value of taxes paid (with no debt) is
T0i(0) = ￿iH0i (5)
Firms can issue zero-coupon bonds at time t = 0; due, with absolute priority, at t = T,
with principal value Pi: They have an incentive to do so as interest on debt is a deductible
expense. However, debt will also increase the probability of default, which is assumed to
cost a fraction ￿i of (positive) cash ￿ ows and to cause a loss proportional to the ￿rm value2.
Let us examine separately the e⁄ects of taxes and bankruptcy costs.
Let D0i(Pi) denote the value, at t = 0; of debt. The promised interest payment is
Pi ￿ D0i(Pi) (6)
Taxable income is the operational one net of interest payment:
Xi ￿ (Pi ￿ D0i(Pi)) (7)
The zero-tax level of cash ￿ ow or tax shield, XZ
i , is then
XZ
i (Pi) = Pi ￿ D0i(Pi) (8)
Hereafter the argument Pi of D0i and XZ
i is often suppressed.
We assume that no tax refunds are paid to the ￿rm when Xi < XZ
i . It follows that
operational cash ￿ ows, net of tax payments, are
Xn
i = X+
i ￿ ￿i(Xi ￿ XZ
i )+ =
8
<
:
0 Xi < 0
Xi 0 < Xi < XZ
i
Xi(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿XZ
i Xi > XZ
i
(9)
Similarly to Merton (1974), default occurs when net operational cash ￿ ow at T is smaller
than the face value of the debt:
Xn
i < Pi (10)
Having de￿ned the default threshold Xd
i as
Xd
i (Pi) = Pi +
￿i
1 ￿ ￿i
D0i(Pi) =
Pi ￿ ￿iXZ
i
1 ￿ ￿i
(11)
the default triggering condition (10) can be written in terms of the pre tax cash ￿ ows as
Xi < Xd
i . Please notice that XZ
i < Xd
i : In the event of default, we assume that bondholders
will receive a fraction (1￿￿i) of operational cash ￿ ow, Xi, when this is positive. They will
however pay taxes out of this fraction, whenever operational cash ￿ ows are greater than
2In our model indeed ￿rm value and cash ￿ ow Xi coincide at maturity T
4the tax shield. Debt holders pay D0i at time 0 to the ￿rm, namely to its initial owners or
equity holders, face to their expected payo⁄s.
The level of debt determines both the probability of default, PRDi; and the (undis-
counted) expected loss. The latter can be computed as the di⁄erence between the full
repayment, Pi, and the expected recovery, D0i(1 + rT). The percentage expected loss is
then
Pi ￿ D0i(1 + rT)
Pi
By taking the ratio of each company expected loss to the corresponding default probability,
we get the loss given default, and therefore the recovery rate
Ri = 1 ￿
Pi ￿ D0i(1 + rT)
Pi ￿ PRDi
(12)
Last but not least, the endogenous spread y can be determined from the ratio between the
face and present value of debt3:
yi = (Pi=D0i)
1=T ￿ 1 ￿ rT (13)
We will assume that the leverage policy of the ￿rm aims at maximizing ￿0i, the sum
of equity and debt, which in turn pairs the after-tax asset value of the ￿rm. The value of
equity and debt is the expected present value of cash ￿ ows accruing to shareholders and
lenders respectively, evaluated under the risk neutral measure. The latter value is included
in the maximization since it is cashed in by shareholders at time 0.
Clearly, the cash ￿ ows accruing to debt and equity holders vary with parent subsidiary
links, which we analyze below.
2.1 Stand alone companies
Let the two activities, i = 1;2; be separately incorporated and independently managed, as
in Leland (2007). Thus the face value of debt issued by ￿rm i maximizes the value of ￿rm
i:
￿0i(Pi) = E0i + D0i (14)
The payo⁄ Ei to shareholders at time t = T is operational cash ￿ ow less taxes and the
repayment of principal, when the di⁄erence is positive:
Ei(Pi) = (Xn
i ￿ Pi)+ (15)
By no arbitrage the value of equity is simply
E0i(Pi) = (1 + rT)￿1E(Xn
i ￿ Pi)+ (16)
The payo⁄ Di to lenders at time t = T will equal Pi when Xi > Xd
i and the ￿rm is solvent.
Recalling that the government has priority for tax payments before lenders, the latter will
3This is the spread over r which makes the principal Pi the compound amount of D0i, over the speci￿ed
horizon T.
5absorb a tax liability ￿i(Xi ￿ XZ
i ) in default when XZ
i < Xi < Xd
i . The payo⁄ to lenders
is therefore
Di(Pi) =
8
<
:
(1 ￿ ￿i)Xi 0 < Xi < XZ
i
(1 ￿ ￿i)Xi ￿ ￿i(Xi ￿ XZ
i ) XZ
i < Xi < Xd
i
Pi Xi > Xd
i
In ￿gure 1 we represent such payo⁄ for a portfolio of stand alone companies. When cash
￿ ow is below (above) Xd
i for both units, there is joint default (survival). Otherwise there
is selective default.
Insert here Figure 1
Debt present value D0i(Pi), the value of zero-coupon debt given the principal Pi, can
be written as
D0i(Pi) =
(1 + rT)￿1E
2
6
4
(1 ￿ ￿i)Xi 1f0<Xi<XZ
i g+
￿
(1 ￿ ￿i)Xi ￿ ￿i(Xi ￿ XZ
i )
￿
1fXZ
i <Xi<Xd
ig+
+Pi 1fXi>Xd
ig
3
7
5 (17)
where 1f￿g is the usual indicator function. The value of debt is negatively a⁄ected by
taxes and bankruptcy costs paid in default states, given Pi. This feeds back on both the
spread in equation (13) and on equity value (16) primarily through its e⁄ect on net income
(7).
Note that (17) is an implicit equation, since XZ
i and Xd
i are themselves a function
of D0i through (8) and (11). Numerical methods are required for its solution. Since D0i
determines the thresholds and the latter enter the equity value, the solution approach for
￿nding ￿rm value ￿0i consists in ￿nding a ￿xed point for D0i and then determine XZ
i ; Xd
i
and E0i.
2.2 Groups
We now depart from Leland (2007) and analyze the case where the two activities are still
separately incorporated, but one of the two - the parent company - transfers cash ￿ ows to
the subsidiary in order to honour debt obligations when this allows the survival of both.
This is consistent with the existence of comfort letters, which motivated Boot et al. (1993)
model, and which is still in force, according to Standard & Poor￿ s reports (Samson, 2001)
and rating agencies evaluations. It is also consistent with the evidence in Dewaelheyns and
Van Hulle (2006), who report that "private business groups support struggling subsidiaries
[..]. However, once groups pro￿tability turns negative, groups tend to terminate support
to weak subsidiaries". In general, cash or asset transfers are the way in which our stylized
model can incorporate those forms of support from the parent to the subsidiary which in
reality take more complex forms, such as transfer pricing at o⁄-market prices, support in
restructuring or renegotiating the terms of debt, collateral provision.
6Let us denote with Xh and Xs the pretax operational cash ￿ ows of the parent (i = h)
and of the subsidiary (i = s), with Xd
i ;XZ
i ;i = h;s their thresholds. Please notice that the
default thresholds Xd
i ; i = h;s and the tax shield XZ
i will be related to debt principal and
present value by (11) and (8), as in the stand alone case. Moreover, since, as we will see,
the holding and subsidiary optimal debts will di⁄er from the stand alone ones, also their
thresholds will.
Following the legal literature, we assume that the parent company enjoys limited lia-
bility if the subsidiary defaults, being not responsible for the subsidiary￿ s debt obligations.
Therefore, equations from (1) to (5) still hold for both the holding and the subsidiary, with
i = h;s instead of i = 1;2, but not for the group (i = g), since limited liability is preserved.
The transfer takes place if the subsidiary is in default while the parent is not. The
parent limited liability implies that there is no rescue if the operational cash ￿ ows of the
subsidiary are negative, as the parent would otherwise bear an operational loss that it could
have avoided. Put together, these restrictions mean that transfer occurs if
￿
0 < Xs < Xd
s;
Xh > Xd
h
(18)
In addition, the parent intervenes only if she is not drag into default by rescue. The
transfer honours the subsidiary debt obligations when the after-tax parent cash ￿ ow, net
of debt repayment exceeds the corresponding di⁄erence for the subsidiary. Since the latter
di⁄erence is negative, the su¢ cient condition for rescue is
Xn
h ￿ Ph > Ps ￿ Xn
s (19)
Overall, a state-contingent transfer will occur if and only if (18) and (19) both hold.
In what follows, we denote the occurrence of these conditions as event A. When rescue
occurs, the holding transfers exactly what the subsidiary is short of in order to repay debt,
namely Ps ￿ Xn
s . The amount of the transfer then is (Ps ￿ Xn
s )1fAg.
The initial owner or shareholder is assumed to choose the face value of debt in the parent
and in the subsidiary so as to maximize levered group value. If we include in the holding
equity (E0h) dividends from the subsidiary, the group value is:
￿0g = ￿0(Ph;Ps;!) = E0h + D0h + (1 ￿ !)E0s + D0s (20)
where ! is the ownership share of the parent in the subsidiary: ! 2 [0;1]. The maxi-
mization is subject to the state contingent payo⁄s which we now characterize. We ￿rst posit
that the parent controls the subsidiary with an in￿nitesimal equity share4: ! = 0. We
later remove this simplifying assumption and study what happens when the parent receives
dividends from its subsidiary. For the sake of simplicity, we write down the model assuming
that the tax rate and default costs do not di⁄er across the two units. Therefore, ￿i = ￿
and ￿i = ￿. This assumption is removed in the numerical analysis of asymmetric cases.
4It is well known that separation of ownership from control is a possibility in business groups. A parent
may directly control a subsidiary with 50% of its voting equity, may indirectly control a second layer
subsidiary with 25% and so on. This feature lies at the basis of several models of group behavior, such
as Bebchuk, et al. (2000).
72.2.1 Control without dividends
When ! = 0 and no dividends are received, the only di⁄erence in events relevant to payo⁄s
with respect to the stand alone case is the existence of A. The corresponding area denoted
as "joint survival with rescue" in Figure 2:
Insert here Figure 2
Selective default of the subsidiary (i.e., default of the subsidiary and survival of the
parent) takes place when its own cash ￿ ow falls below its default threshold, while the
parent cash ￿ ow exceeds its own default threshold but either is not used to support the
subsidiary (since Xs < 0), or is not su¢ cient to support it (Xs < 0 and (19) not satis￿ed).5
Figure 2 depicts also the combinations of cash ￿ ow realizations leading to either joint
default (Xi < Xd
i ;i = h;s), or selective default of the parent, or joint survival without
rescue. Comparison with ￿gure 1 allows to appreciate the potentially positive e⁄ect of
group structure on the subsidiary credit quality, keeping the thresholds ￿xed: the area of
its selective default shrinks as a consequence of the parent transfer. However, as stated
above, the optimal thresholds are endogenously determined.
The cash-￿ ow accruing to shareholders of the parent company is equal to the stand
alone one, (Xn
h ￿ Ph)
+, less the transfer amount. As a consequence, it depends on both
principals Ph and Ps:
Eh(Ph;Ps) = (Xn
h ￿ Ph)
+ ￿ (Ps ￿ Xn
s )1fAg (21)
The equity value is
E0h(Ph;Ps) = (1 + rT)￿1E
￿
(Xn
h ￿ Ph)
+ ￿ (Ps ￿ Xn
s )1fAg
￿
(22)
The payo⁄ to subsidiary lenders is the same as in the stand alone case, in the states
where no transfer takes place.6 These states are formally characterized as
8
<
:
Xs < Xd
s
Xh > Xd
h
Xn
h ￿ Ph < Ps ￿ Xn
s
and are denoted as event B [ C: Events B or C in turn occur respectively when the
subsidiary does not pay taxes (Xs < XZ
s ) or pays them (XZ
s < Xs < Xd
s).
The payo⁄ to lenders must instead be augmented by the transfer in the transfer area,
denoted as event A. There, it would have been Xn
s . Including the transfer, it becomes
Xn
s + (Ps ￿ Xn
s ) = Ps.
5The equation of the straight lines which bound the "joint survival with rescue" zone from below are
known in closed form.
6We are assuming that there is no consolidation of assets in the event of default of the parent - which
seems consistent with what happens in most real-world cases (Samson, 2001).
8Since the subsidiary debt is the present expected value of these ￿nal payo⁄s, it becomes:
D0s(Ps;Ph) =
(1 + rT)
￿1 E
2
6
4
Xs(1 ￿ ￿)1fBg+
+
￿
Xs(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(Xs ￿ XZ
s )
￿
1fCg+
+Ps
h
1fAg + 1fXs>Xd
sg
i
3
7
5 (23)
The reader can notice that debt depends on the principals of both subsidiary and parent
companies, since the transfer does. As in the stand alone case, a ￿xed point of the debt
function determines its value and consequently those of the thresholds Xd
s and XZ
s . Thus
both E0h and D0s, as well as the corresponding thresholds, depend on principals Ph and
Ps, which must be simultaneously chosen.
The payo⁄s to lenders of the parent do not change with respect to the stand alone case,
as the transfer to the subsidiary occurs only after the service of the parent debt. Similarly,
equity holders of the subsidiary are una⁄ected, as the transfer occurs for the sake of servicing
debt. As a consequence equations (17) and (15) still hold for i = h and i = s respectively,
and
D0h = D0h(Ph);E0s = E0s(Ps) (24)
It should be noted that nothing prevents, so far, the switch of the labels "subsidiary"
and "parent". In other words, rescue goes in one direction only - from one company to
the other - but the two companies are otherwise symmetric. In the next section we instead
allow only the parent to receive dividends.7
2.2.2 Control with dividend ￿ ows
We now consider the general case of non-zero dividend ￿ ows from the subsidiary to the
parent, 0 < ! ￿ 1. Dividends are another type of state- contingent transfer: they are not
distributed when the subsidiary is in default and are proportional to its pro￿t after interest
and taxes otherwise. Thus, cash ￿ ows received by stakeholders do not change as long as
the subsidiary defaults, namely when Xs < Xd
s, or, equivalently, Xn
s < Ps. In the opposite
case, the parent cash ￿ ows include both operational earnings and dividends.
If we exclude double taxation of subsidiary income, the cash ￿ ows of the parent become:
Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ (25)
By absolute priority these cash ￿ ows, when positive, ￿rst repay debt, up to its face value
Ph, then equity.
The payo⁄ to parent lenders, which by a ￿xed point argument determines its debt
current value, D0h, is then equal to:
Dh (Ps;Ph) =
8
<
:
0 Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ < 0
(1 ￿ ￿)[Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+] 0 < Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ < Ph
Ph Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ > Ph
(26)
7While nothing logically prevents the subsidiary from receiving dividends, cross-holdings are often pro-
hibited in the real world.
9In the ￿rst case, the parent cash ￿ ows are negative despite dividends. Thus, lenders
get zero. In the second case, cash ￿ ows are positive but the service of debt is only partial.
In the last case, cash ￿ ows gross of dividends exceed the face value of debt which is fully
reimbursed.
It follows from the previous expression that Xd
h, the parent default threshold with in-
￿nitesimal ownership, remains the default threshold under the new ownership structure
only until dividends are not received. When the subsidiary pays out dividends, the default
threshold is the level of operational cash ￿ ows, net of taxes but gross of dividends, that
equals Ph. It is the level of Xh such that
Xn
h + ! (Xn
s ￿ Ps) = Ph (27)
This new default threshold then depends on the subsidiary cash ￿ ow Xs. It can be
shown to be greater than the parent tax shield, and therefore to entail tax payments, as
long as Xs < X￿
s. The latter threshold is a known function of the default thresholds with
in￿nitesimal ownership, the parent tax shield and the ownership share !. As a whole, the
new holding default threshold is depicted as a dotted line in ￿gure 3 below.
In Figure 3 we visualize also the corresponding default and non default events.
Insert here Figure 3
The payo⁄ to parent equity holders, Eh, is similarly a⁄ected by the shift of the default
threshold, with respect to the in￿nitesimal ownership case, due to dividends. It amounts to:
Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ (28)
when Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ > Ph.
Dividends from the subsidiary may therefore rescue the parent whenever they cover the
parent operational losses. As long as no dividends are paid (Xs < Xd
s), the occurrence of
joint and selective default does not di⁄er across ￿gures 2 and 38. The subsidiary dividends
are able to rescue the parent from default when they are "large enough", namely if Xh < Xd
h
and ! (Xn
s ￿ Ps) > ￿(Xn
h ￿ Ph). This happens in the zone which we label "joint survival
with dividend rescue". The boundaries of this zone are again a known (but unreported
here) function of the levels XZ
i ,Xd
i , and of the principals Ps;Ph.
The equity and debt value in the parent obtain by discounting the expectation of cash
￿ ows to shareholders and lenders, respectively. The problem is complicated by the fact that
now they both depend also on the face value of the subsidiary debt9, i.e.
8The optimal threshold levels (X
Z￿
i , X
d￿
i , the rescue/no rescue lines) will di⁄er, since ￿rm values - the
parent debt in particular - do.
9As a matter of fact parent equity holders receive no dividends when the subsidiary is in default, an
occurrence that depend on the face value of the subsidiary debt. When the subsidiary pays out dividends,
parent equity holders have right to them once any operational loss is o⁄set and parent lenders are reimbursed,
an occurrence which depends on the parent face value of debt.
10D0h = D0h(Ph;Ps) = (1+rT)￿1E
"
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s ￿ Ps)+]1
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(29)
E0h = E0h(Ph;Ps) = (1 + rT)￿1E
h￿
Xn
h + !(Xn
s ￿ Ps)+ ￿
1fXn
h+!(Xn
s ￿Ps)+>Phg
i
(30)
The value of subsidiary debt is una⁄ected by dividend payment, and remains equal to
D0s = D0s(Ps;Ph). The value of its equity;(1￿!)E0s = (1￿!)E0s(Ps), is also unchanged.
They can be represented respectively as in (23) and as a fraction (1 ￿ !) of (15).
Given the above payo⁄s parent and subsidiary principals are chosen so as to maximize
group value10
(P￿
h(!);P￿
s (!)) = argmaxv0g(Ph;Ps;!) (31)
obtained by substituting in (20) the expressions in section 2.2.1 or 2.2.2.
Once the optimal principals are determined, the current values of both debt, D￿
0h(!),
D￿
0s(!), and equity, E￿
0h(!), E￿
0s(!), can be computed. The optimal tax shields XZ￿
i (!) and
default thresholds Xd￿
i (!) follow.
The probabilities corresponding to the di⁄erent events in ￿gures 2 and 3 can be computed
once the optimal tax shields, default thresholds and principal values are known. In what
follows we will denote the selective default probabilities as PRDSi; i = h;s, the joint
default probability as PRDJ and the marginal default probabilities (PRDSi + PRDJ)
as PRDi; i = h;s: We will also be interested in the rescue probability, PRR, and in the
joint survival (with or without rescue), PRND. Finally, we will obtain recovery rates and
spreads over Treasury.
2.3 Conglomerates
The conglomerate merger case - introduced in Leland (2007) - obtains when the two activ-
ities Xi; i = 1;2, are incorporated as one company. It may also obtain, despite separate
incorporation, when a parent company deliberately becomes legally responsible for its sub-
sidiary debt obligations by issuing a legally binding guarantee.
The merger cash ￿ ow Xm is the sum of the cash ￿ ows of the original activities:
Xm = X1 + X2 (32)
10There is no closed formula for the group value, even with in￿nitesimal ownership. As evident in the
text, at least the current value of debt and the thresholds (tax shield and default) of each name depend on
the principals. We study the maximization problem numerically, in a base case - whose parameter values are
drawn from Leland (2007) - and under some alternative parameter combinations. In the base case without
dividends group value is concave in the subsidiary principal, for given holding principal, and decreasing in the
latter, for given subsidiary principal. In the alternative cases too we explored the monotonicity properties
of the group value in order to present the global maximum and not a local one.
11Equations from (1) to (5) hold for the whole conglomerate (i = m), since one ￿rm can
drag the other into default. The unique choice variable is the face value of debt, Pm; which
maximizes11
￿0m = ￿0(Pm) = E0(Pm) + D0(Pm) (33)
where E0(Pm) and D0(Pm) are computed according to (15) and (17) with i = m. Debt is
again a ￿xed point, while XZ
m and Xd
m are de￿ned as in (8) and (11). After having selected
the optimal debt value for the merger, P￿
m = argmax￿0m, one obtains via (15) and (17)
the current value of optimized debt and equity, E0(P￿
m) and D0(P￿
m). The optimal leverage
ratio follows, together with the optimal tax shield and default threshold, XZ￿
m and Xd￿
m .
In the conglomerate case the probability of selective default is zero. Thus the probability
of joint default PRDJ coincides with the default probability of the merger, PRDm. The
recovery rate and the spread are determined using (12) and (13) in the common set up.
3 Credit risk: a base case
We will numerically study the credit risk implications of the organizational structures out-
lined above assuming that - for each company - annual cash ￿ ows are Normal i.i.d.
We start from a base case, whose parameters are borrowed from Leland (2007), in which
companies have identically - although not independently - distributed cash ￿ ows. We will
refer to them as being symmetric. The parameters which characterize the symmetric case
are calibrated to those of ￿rms that - as stand alone - issue BBB-rated unsecured debt. In
particular, the debt maturity is assumed to be ￿ve years, consistent with investment grade
evidence. Given an annual riskless interest rate of 5%, expected operational cash ￿ ow for
each activity, Mu = 127.6, is chosen such that its present value is X0 = 100. Operational
cash ￿ ow at the end of 5 years has a standard deviation (Std) of 49.2. Given that annual
cash ￿ ows are independent in time, this is consistent with an annual standard deviation of
22.0 (= 49.2/
p
5). Henceforth we express volatility ￿ as an annual percent of initial activity
value X0, e.g. ￿ = 22%. The tax rate ￿ = 20% and the default cost parameter ￿ = 23%
are chosen so as to generate optimal leverage and recovery rates consistent with the BBB
choice (see Leland, 2007).
Insert here Table 1
When the correlation coe¢ cient between the units cash ￿ ows is equal to 0.2, as in
Leland (2007) we obtain the optimal capital structure and credit risk indicators of table 2.
The ￿rst column reports values for a stand alone. The second and the third refer to parent
and subsidiary respectively. The fourth refers to the overall group, while the last column
to a conglomerate.
Insert here Table 2
11In the conglomerate case - as well as in the stand alone - ￿rm value is not a monotonic function of the
principal value of debt. However, in this case too we will present the global maximum and not a local one.
12Let us analyze the stand alone versus group situation (columns one to four) ￿rst and
compare it with its cum dividend counterpart. The stand alone model and the group versus
conglomerate comparison (columns four and ￿ve) will follow.
3.1 Group versus stand alone
The ￿rst, important feature of Table 2 is that the overall group debt is on the subsidiary￿ s
shoulders. The best way to solve the bankruptcy costs versus tax savings trade o⁄ is to
raise capital via the subsidiary, given the possibility of supporting it when insolvent. The
subsidiary can indeed be saved from bankruptcy, so as to avoid the proportional loss of
value inherent in default. It can also be left alone when transferring money to it would
deplete the overall group value without avoiding bankruptcy costs.12
The resulting face value of debt for the subsidiary is higher than that of two stand alone
companies (219 versus 114.4). This characteristic of the optimal solution is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006), who notice that the "decreased
potential costs of ￿nancial distress allow group members to ex ante take on more debt, thus
realizing more tax gains". It is a fortiori consistent with the very high leverage observed in
project ￿nancing, LBOs and private equity, which are closer to our assumption of no agency
costs.13
Such a high debt produces a considerable increase in the no tax threshold of the sub-
sidiary (102.32 versus 14.98), and an associated increase in its asset value with respect to
that of one stand alone (116.71 versus 81.23). The overall group value ￿￿
0g (165.91) is higher
than twice that of a stand alone (162.46), even though the parent value - which does not
raise debt and stands ready to rescue its subsidiary - falls with respect to the stand alone
situation (from 81.23 to 49.2). Thus parent-subsidiary links that preserve limited liability
while allowing for state-contingent support create value for ￿nanciers. This explains the
pervasiveness of parent-subsidiary arrangements, not only as business groups, but also as
private equity funds and LBOs.
Leverage impacts on the marginal default probabilities. These go from PRD1 =
PRD2 = 11:2% for each stand alone to PRDh = 0:34% for the parent and PRDs = 46:54%
for its subsidiary. The latter is more likely to default than a stand alone, in spite of rescue
(which takes place 52.35% of the times), because of its extreme leverage. However, in the
absence of rescue, its default probability would be even larger - actually close to one (99.3%).
This is a potential explanation for the coexistence of highly leveraged transactions and a
comparatively fairly low number of defaults in private equity and LBOs (Jensen, 2007).
The recovery rate falls from 48.1% for the stand alone to 31.2% for the subsidiary.
Indeed, the parent is more likely to be unable to support its subsidiary when the latter
12Since a symmetric manoeuvre is not possible, the subsidiary is leveraged while the parent is not. However
all debt would be borne by the parent in a group arrangement where rescue transfers are possible from the
subsidiary to the parent only. Indeed, in the case under analysis there is no di⁄erence between the companies
- other than the direction of the rescue possibility and the label.
13They are also close to our rescue committment in spite of potential ex post ine¢ ciency, since, as Jensen
(1989) says "[...] an LBO partnership that tries to pro￿t at the expense of its creditors or walks away from
a deal gone sour will not be able to raise funds for future investments."
13losses are larger - leaving these low recovery cases to lenders. The decline in recovery when
the default probability increases - or, equivalently, the increase in loss given default, its
complement to one - is an important feature to capture, since empirical evidence supports
it (see for instance Altman and Fanjul, 2004). As a consequence of high default probability
and low recovery, the credit spread dramatically increases for the subsidiary with respect
to the stand alone (8.4% versus 1.26% over ￿ve years).
The previous ￿gures are better understood if we consider not only the marginal default
probabilities, but also the selective, rescue and joint default probabilities. Under the group
organization, selective default of the subsidiary occurs in PRDSs = 46:2% of the possible
cases, while rescue occurs in 52.35% of the occurrences. These are the two most likely
scenarios: either the subsidiary defaults, because of the leverage ratio it has been charged
together with inability of the parent to rescue her, or it is indeed rescued. Joint default,
given that the parent is unlevered, is very rare (0.34%) compared to joint default of two
stand alone ￿rms (2%). These observations imply that the risk of ￿rm portfolios will be
a⁄ected by the incidence of subsidiaries (or parents) in the portfolio, as well as by the type
of parent subsidiary link.
When the parent not only exerts control, but also receives 100% of the subsidiary divi-
dends (! = 1), the whole debt should be again borne by the subsidiary. The overall capital
structure and credit risk implications of the model are invariant, as apparent from Table
3. Therefore the amount of expected dividends and the associated increase in the parent
company equity value are negligible (0.037 when ￿ = 0:2), given that the subsidiary is highly
leveraged.
Insert here Table 3
The lesson we draw is that when agency costs can be neglected the internal capital
market, and more speci￿cally state-contingent transfers targeted to rescue, determine the
optimal capital structure. Non targeted ones, like dividends in our model, are not crucial
as they do not a⁄ect the trade-o⁄ between the tax-shield and bankruptcy costs.
3.2 Conglomerate versus stand alone and group
It is well known that divisions of a conglomerate diversify away some risk provided that
their operational cash ￿ ows are less than perfectly correlated (Lewellen, 1971). This justi￿es
the ￿ndings that the conglomerate raises more debt than the two stand alone ￿rms (Leland,
2007). Because of risk sharing, the higher tax advantages induced by higher debt are not
completely o⁄set by higher expected default costs, and such a leverage policy creates a
merge value ￿￿
m greater than twice the optimal value of two stand alone ￿rms: merging
is pro￿table. These results can be visualized by comparing the ￿rst with the last column
of Table 2: for the conglomerate, the overall debt (117.4) and company value (163.15) are
greater than for two stand alone companies (114.4 and 162.46 respectively).
A conglomerate is more levered than two stand alone units because its debt is issued
against a diversi￿ed portfolio of assets. Its default probability is higher (6.5% instead of
2%, the joint default probability of two stand alone units) since one activity can drag the
14other, pro￿table one into default (Sarig, 1985). For the same reason, this is accompanied by
higher recovery (56.5 instead of 48.1%). The increase in recovery outweighs that in default
probability, thus reducing the spread (0.6% instead of 1.26% )
We now turn to the comparison between a conglomerate and a group. Our model shows
that group debt capacity is greater than for conglomerates (219 versus 117.4 in terms of
face value). The group is able to implement state-dependent rescue, as opposed to the state
independent one inherent in cash ￿ ow pooling of mergers14. As a consequence, in spite of
higher face value of debt and endogenous spread and default probability, the value of a group,
￿￿
0g = 165.91, exceeds that of a conglomerate, ￿￿
0m = 163.15. The speci￿cities of the group -
namely limited liability and separate incorporation - allow to tailor capital structure so as
to increase the no tax pro￿t level (to 102.32 from 14 for the merger) and halve bankruptcy
costs. Indeed, while the expected tax payments decrease from 35.62 for the merger to 25.38
for the group, the corresponding default costs raise only from 1.24 to 7.98. The proportional
nature of default costs can be responsible for such a result: however, it is consistent with
empirical evidence and it will be con￿rmed also in section 5 below, where the subsidiary
leverage is constrained and the wedge default costs - tax savings cannot be fully exploited.
There is indeed increasing evidence of the role of taxes in determining the capital structure
for public ￿rms (see Graham, 2003). The prevalence of tax savings over default costs has
also been empirically detected for bank ￿nanced, non listed, small or medium sized ￿rms
(see f.i. Bartholday and Mateus, 2005).
The probability of joint default falls to 0.34% from 6.5% even if the optimal leverage
ratio is greater for groups than for conglomerates: 70% for the former and 54.8% for the
latter.
It will be evident from the next section, namely from the fact that the group arrangement
creates value with respect to the merger for any correlation level, that its comparative
advantage does not come from diversi￿cation only. It comes from the fact that it exploits
diversi￿cation better than a merger: in the latter an insolvent unit can drag the other into
default, so that rescue is symmetric. In a group the Sarig e⁄ect cannot occur and only
pro￿table rescues occur.15
Parent-subsidiary relationships in groups are value enhancing with respect to merg-
ers, even tough they considerably deplete the credit worthiness of subsidiaries, have lower
recovery, greater default probabilities and far higher spreads than mergers.
14It is also able to exploit the asymmetry of taxation, namely the di⁄erent elasticity of the tax shield and
of the default threshold with respect to leverage. Tax asymmetry is studied in a companion paper, Luciano
and Nicodano (2007).
15The transfer can turn out to be ex post ine¢ cient: this drawback is overcome in an in￿nite horizon version
of the current model. Indeed, it can be shown that, at least in the numerical case analyzed here, shareholders￿
cash ￿ ows are always greater when they pay back loans and outside ￿nanciers continue partecipating than
in the opposite case, when they fail to rescue and outside ￿nancing is truncated. As an alternative, one
can envisage a full commitment versus partial committment to rescue. The group case reported here would
correspond to full commitment, the stand alone one to no committment. Partial commitment would produce
groups unable to maximize value with respect to alternative arrangements. Such a commitment role - which
was pointed out to us by H. Leland - is studied in a revised version of the companion paper Luciano and
Nicodano (2007).
154 Credit risk as correlation changes
It is evident that correlation should play a role in the results obtained so far. Exploring
Leland￿ s model, we get the perhaps unsurprising result that the merger should raise as much
debt as two stand alone units when correlation equals 1. This is because the distinctive
characteristic of conglomerates is diversi￿cation.
For the same reason, one may expect that the optimal face values of debt in groups will
converge to the stand alone level as correlation among cash ￿ ow increases, since the transfers
from the parent to the subsidiary will become less likely. This intuition is incorrect: debt in
the parent continues to be zero, because this still allows to eliminate the parent bankruptcy
costs. The tax shelter di⁄erential between raising debt in the parent and raising it in the
subsidiary is evidently not strong enough to move debt from the subsidiary to the parent -
i.e. from the company which can be rescued to the other one - since the same face amount
of debt in the initially unlevered parent deserves less interests than in the highly levered
subsidiary. When correlation increases, support from the holding decreases, recovery tends
to increase and this allows for further debt to be issued by the subsidiary. Figure 4, top
left corner, reports the optimal leverage ratio for the three types of parent/subsidiary links.
As correlation increases, the e⁄ect of diversi￿cation vanishes and the optimal leverage of a
conglomerate converges to that of a stand alone as discussed above. On the contrary, the
one of groups falls from over 80% to less than 70%, a ￿gure which remains 30% higher than
leverage of conglomerates and stand alone ￿rms. As a consequence, the value di⁄erential
with respect to the stand alone situation is increasing for groups, but decreasing for the
merger, since in the latter case the lack of diversi￿cation when correlation increases is not
counterbalanced by the ability to raise the tax shield. The behavior of ￿￿
0 is shown in Figure
4, top right corner.
The bottom plots of Figure 4 represent the recovery rate (left) and credit spread (right):
apart from the fact that the inequalities across organizational forms hold throughout, we
notice that the spread sensitivity to correlation are higher in the group case. Cross subsi-
dization makes the merger recovery higher than under no support (stand alone) and under
conditional rescue (group), since the latter is likely to be ine⁄ective in front of large losses.
Merger spread too bene￿ts from cross subsidization, while the group spread boosts up
because of high leverage and conditional rescue only.
Insert here Figure 4
We can summarize the results from Figure 4 as follows:
Proposition 1 Assume positive bankruptcy costs, ￿scal deductibility of interest and the
ability of the parent company to commit to state contingent transfers to its subsidiary for
BBB companies. Then the leverage of a group, as well as the resulting ￿rm value, exceeds
the one of conglomerates and of the corresponding stand alone companies. The holding is
unlevered. The recovery rate of the group, which coincides with the subsidiary one, is lower,
while the spread over Treasuries is larger than in other parent-subsidiary links.
16The leverage results are re￿ ected in default probabilities. In the top panel of Figure
5 we contrast the marginal default probability of a stand alone and a subsidiary. At a
correlation equal to -0.8, the default probabilities are equal, despite the much higher debt
in the subsidiary. This is clearly due to the high probability of support by the parent.
For comparison, we also add to the picture the default probability of a stand alone with
the optimal subsidiary leverage: this is close to 100% for all correlation coe¢ cients, as
the amazing leverage of the subsidiary becomes unsustainable when no rescue through an
internal capital market takes place.
In the bottom panel of Figure 5, we add to the merger and group joint probabilities of
default the chances for two stand alone companies to default together, evaluated at their
own optimal capital structure. They would default more often than the group, even if the
latter is more leveraged, given that they cannot support each other. They would however
default less than the merger, since the latter is more levered and subsidization is not state
contingent. Figure 5 then con￿rms the bene￿cial e⁄ects of groups in terms of value and
default probabilities, at the expense of the subsidiary safety.
Insert here Figure 5
Figure 5 is especially important for understanding how parent/subsidiary links may
a⁄ect the default probability of ￿rm portfolios, and therefore bank stability. Two stand
alone ￿rms would default less than the merger, since they would be far less leveraged
and none of them would drag the other into default. At the same time, as correlation
between activity cash ￿ ows increases, the joint default probability of two stand alone ￿rms
dramatically departs from the joint default probability of the group. Thus, a portfolio of
group-a¢ liated parent and subsidiary couples appears to be more resilient than a portfolio
of stand-alone companies, which already improves over a merger.
Another way to assess the impact of di⁄erent parent-subsidiary links onto their portfolio
behavior consists in computing default correlation, which is the correlation between the
default indicators16. Figure 6 presents the default correlation of stand alone companies
and their group, as a function of their asset correlation: forming a group out of two stand
alone companies eliminates negative default correlation, and smooths out the e⁄ect of cash
￿ ow correlation in the portfolio. A portfolio of stand alone companies trades o⁄ a mild
negative default correlation - close to -10% - when their activities are negatively correlated
for a destabilizing high positive correlation - close to 55% - in the opposite case. When
the independently managed ￿rms turn into a group, their default correlation stays close to
5% for all levels of asset correlation: stability is achieved since joint default occurrence is
very low, but not very sensitive to asset correlation. At the same time negative default
correlation is lost.
Insert here Figure 6
16It is computed as follows:
PRDJ ￿ PRDiPRDj p
PRDi (1 ￿ PRDi)PRDj (1 ￿ PRDj)
175 The case of a constrained subsidiary
We now optimize leverage in the holding, imposing a subsidiary debt level equal to the
stand alone one (57.2), in order to mimic agency costs or regulatory constraints on leverage.
Agency costs are indeed a well known reason for ￿rms to maintain leverage ratios lower than
the optimal ones: in their presence capital markets reduce the size of the issue or demand
strict covenants. As for regulatory covenants, there are at least two reasons for observing
them. First, in some subsidiaries, shareholders may not have any stake in the holding.
This situation for instance occurs when only subsidiaries are listed on public exchanges.
Several jurisdictions impose to subsidiary managers to act in the interest of the subsidiary
shareholders, rather than implement what is optimal for the group (Hadden, 1996). In
this circumstance, a leverage close to 100% and a value of equity close to zero in the
subsidiary can easily be considered as a violation of the rule. Second, regulation against
thin capitalization, such as the Italian one, can prevent high leverage in the subsidiary. We
examine both the case of in￿nitesimal ownership and the ￿nite one.
5.1 In￿nitesimal ownership
Insert here Table 4
Table 4 shows that the optimal debt in the parent company has a face value which is
closer to the subsidiary one, and - as a consequence - the di⁄erence in the value of debt and
equity is lower than in the unconstrained case. Group value still exceeds that of stand alone
￿rms, but the di⁄erential shrinks, as expected default costs for the parent are now positive.
Let us focus for the moment on the case ￿ = 0:2: The relative leverage of parent and
subsidiaries (50% and 53%) is now closer to the one observed in Belgian and Italian groups,
where the former tends to exceed the latter (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Dewaelheyns and
Van Hulle, 2007). Similarly, the implied optimal group leverage (51%) is close to the stand
alone level of Table 2 - and closer to that part of evidence which shows that the group
leverage tends to be smaller than stand alone leverage (Deloof and Verschueren, 2001;
Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2007). In spite of lower leverage, the group has greater value
than two stand alone companies (162.79 instead of 162.46), so that its existence is justi￿ed.
The comparison between the unconstrained and constrained case gives a stylized picture of
the di⁄erential between more and less regulated parent-subsidiary links. According to our
model, highly levered arrangements such as the ones observed in private equity can indeed
be explained by weaker regulation, while the milder ones in public groups are consistent
with the latter being subject to greater external monitoring and regulation.
The Table also presents the recovery, marginal default probabilities and spreads for the
group a¢ liated and for the corresponding stand alone units. All the endogenous credit
evaluations for the subsidiary di⁄er from those of a stand alone, despite their common
face value of debt. In particular, its default probability is much smaller, since the holding
can support it. Consequently the spread it deserves is also smaller, even if its recovery
continues to unfavorably compare to that of the stand alone (58 bp, instead of 126 for the
stand alone). The evaluations for the holding too are better than those of a stand alone: the
18face value of its debt is slightly less than the subsidiary, i.e. the stand alone, one; since the
holding provides support only when this does not endanger her lenders, despite an almost
unchanged recovery, it deserves a lower spread than a stand alone (112 bp). The probability
of joint default for two stand alone ￿rms still exceeds that for the group (2% versus 1.81%).
Despite the similar debt burden, the parent recovery rate is much higher than that of
a subsidiary, as it does not depend on support (46% versus 24%). The joint default proba-
bility reaches 1.81%, versus 0.34% in the unconstrained case. Conversely, the occurrence of
selective defaults in the subsidiary reduces to 9.6%, down from 46% in the unconstrained
case. Finally, the probability of selective default of the parent (7.8%) now by far exceeds
that of the subsidiary (1.8%) - which has similar leverage but receives support from its
parent.
Moving out of the ￿ = 0:2 correlation case, we observe that the holding - and therefore
the group - debt decreases as diversi￿cation opportunities vanish, contrary to what happens
in the unconstrained case. In fact, debt in the subsidiary cannot increase in order to
counteract the rising recovery rate associated with reduced support - as was happening in
the unconstrained case. In addition, the spread of the holding decreases with correlation,
since rescue opportunities are reduced.
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2 Consider a subsidiary with face value of debt equal to that of a BBB stand
alone company. Assume positive bankruptcy costs, ￿scal deductibility of interests, the ability
of the holding company to commit to state contingent transfers to its subsidiary and control
with in￿nitesimal ownership. Then the group leverage exceeds the one of the corresponding
BBB stand alone companies only for low correlation. The ￿rm value is always greater for
groups than for stand alone ￿rms. The parent optimal leverage is positive and close to the
subsidiary and stand alone one; the default probability of both the subsidiary and the parent,
their recovery rate and spreads are lower than the stand alone ones.
Also for this case we computed the historical default probabilities and the implicit rating
assignment.
Default correlations too are a⁄ected by constraints. Figure 7 below compares the default
correlation of two stand alone ￿rms with the one in their constrained group: even though
debt principal is unchanged for the subsidiary and is not far from the stand alone one for
the holding, default correlation deteriorates considerably. It turns from negative to positive
or - when positive - increases.
Insert here Figure 7
Introducing a group structure while maintaining ￿xed the debt face value of the sub-
sidiary - and optimizing the holding one - has a positive impact on the credit worthiness of
both ￿rms: both ￿rms￿spreads lower. However, in contrast with the unconstrained case,
the portfolio e⁄ect is not so favorable: face to an almost unchanged joint default probability,
the correlation worsens.
195.2 Finite ownership
Insert here Table 5
Table 5 compares the optimized features of holdings and constrained subsidiaries under
in￿nitesimal ownership with the ￿nite ownership ones, when ! = :5 or 1, and correlation is
mild (￿ = :2). Ownership share, which was almost irrelevant in the unconstrained case, turns
out to a⁄ect the optimal policies. The holding gets more levered as ownership increases,
since it can count on a greater dividend payo⁄ to pay debt back (from 0 to 39). Greater
leverage increases the overall group value, which departs more from the two stand alone
￿rms￿level.
The holding default probability and spread decrease, in spite of greater leverage, since
it gets more dividends, which can be used to repay loans. Overall, therefore, the greater
debt burden on the holding does not impact negatively on its credit quality, since it is
counterbalanced by greater dividends.
As for the subsidiary, even though the face value of debt is constant, its present value
slightly decreases. The holding uses cash ￿ ows to cover its loans, instead of rescuing: as a
result, the tax shield increases, the default threshold lowers, as well as default probability,
spread goes slightly up. In spite of constant face value of debt, the subsidiary￿ s credit
worthiness is therefore weakly damaged by the greater aggressiveness in leveraging the
holding: spread indeed su⁄ers.
6 Asymmetric companies
In this section we consider the leverage and credit risk outcomes for non identically dis-
tributed activities. In particular, we will in turn analyze the cases of lower default costs
(Table 6), higher volatility (Table 7) and smaller size (Table 8) for the subsidiary. These
cases have been shown to be value enhancing with respect to the opposite ones. That is,
the expected value of the group would be lower if the subsidiary were less volatile, costlier
and larger than its holding company, at their optimal unconstrained capital structure (see
Luciano and Nicodano, 2007). We maintain the ￿ = 0:2 assumption.
Insert here Table 6
Higher default costs in the holding do not change the type of optimal capital structure,
in the sense that the whole debt burden is still borne by the subsidiary only. Setting to
zero the holding company leverage is a fortiori optimal with larger default costs. These will
never be incurred in, and hence cannot a⁄ect credit quality or spreads or value. Even if
costs are as high as 75%, exactly the same face value of debt obtains as in the symmetric
case above. Comparison across Table 6 and Table 3 reveals that both stand alone entities￿
and conglomerates￿values su⁄er from the increase in bankruptcy costs of one unit. This
indicates that the capital structure ￿ exibility allowed by group structure can be especially
valuable when there are asymmetric bankruptcy costs across activities.
Insert here Table 7
20A riskier subsidiary faces a reduced probability to both independently survive and to be
rescued by the holding, for given leverage. As a consequence, the subsidiary turns out to
have a slightly lower leverage. Consider the case in which risk in the subsidiary is twice as
large as in the holding, since volatility is equal to 44% and 22% for the subsidiary and the
holding respectively. The optimal subsidiary leverage is 97.3% instead of 100% in the base
case. Its default probability increases (48.7% instead of 46.5%); the corresponding recovery
and spread are 20.2% and 10.9%, which are respectively smaller and higher than in the
symmetric case (31.2% and 8.4%)17.
When risk doubles, the stand alone spread jumps to 6.2% from 1.26%. In conglomerates
diversi￿cation opportunities help, but the spread still more than doubles (from 0.6% to 2%).
In groups it increases without doubling (from 8.4% to 10.9%) Thus, the credit quality of a
group appears to be less sensitive to highly volatile cash ￿ ows in one of its units; its capital
structure ￿ exibility can help maintaining credit quality in situations of asymmetric risk.
Insert here Table 8
Size asymmetry makes it pro￿table to shift some debt onto the holding. Let us explore
the case in which the holding is ￿ve times as large as its subsidiary in the sense that the
mean of the ￿nal operational cash ￿ ow (Mu) is such a multiple. Percentage volatility is
kept ￿xed and equal for the two units. The holding leverage ratio rises from zero to 51%,
while that of the subsidiary is unchanged relative to the symmetric case. The holding cash
￿ ow is comparatively large enough to be able to rescue its subsidiary despite its positive
debt commitment, which reduces its tax burden: the rescue probability is 66%. The credit
quality of the holding drops, as its default probability increases to 4.5% from 0.34% in the
symmetric case. However, its selective default probability is still zero: it defaults when also
the subsidiary does. Since the holding is leveraged, the impact - in terms of portfolio default
correlation - of creating a group out of two stand alone ￿rms becomes relevant for lenders.
The group default correlation stays close to 30% for all levels of asset correlation.
Overall, we may conclude that the insights obtained in the symmetric case are robust
to parametric changes.
7 Summary and concluding remarks
Our model provides optimal leverage policies and credit risk measurement in a situation of
interdependence between ￿rms which, as far as we know, was not modelled explicitly in pre-
vious studies. It contributes to the literature on credit risk by showing how state-contingent
support by a parent company modi￿es optimal capital structure and the associated default
probability in a¢ liated companies.
In the absence of regulatory constraints and with symmetric ￿rms, optimal capital struc-
ture entails a highly-leveraged subsidiary, with a face value of debt that can be almost four
times the stand-alone one and the one of a conglomerate division. By contrast, dividends
17Also in the group case, we ￿nd that as default probability grows for higher volatility the recovery rate
falls. This is a stylized fact in the literature on credit risk (Altman et al., 2004).
21from the subsidiary to the parent company hardly a⁄ect optimal leverage and credit qual-
ity, because they leave the tax-bankruptcy cost trade-o⁄ unchanged. In such cases, our
model predicts zero optimal leverage for supporting companies. We are thus suggesting
one potential explanation both for the presence of a large proportion of zero debt ￿rms
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2006) and for the presence of high leverage holding companies in
fairly unregulated structures such as going private arrangements, private equity funds and
project ￿nancing, for which there is strong empirical evidence. At the same time, since the
group default probability in our model is extremely low, we are resolving the con￿ ict be-
tween highly leveraged transactions and the infrequent occurrence of default (Jensen, 1989,
Jensen, 2007, Andrade and Kaplan, 1998, Kaplan, 1989).
The implied optimal capital structure of group ￿rms may however be considered at
odds with the less extreme leverage of many non-stand alone companies. By introducing
constraints and asymmetric companies, our model is able to capture also such situations,
proper of public ownership arrangements, such as most traditional business groups and
more regulated environments.
Our theory o⁄ers insights into how parent-subsidiary links a⁄ect default probabilities of
the a¢ liated units. It explains why the prediction of default frequency conditional on ￿rm
debt improves when the credit standing of the other a¢ liated units is taken into account
(Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006). More than that, it rationalizes selective defaults and
the discriminating assignments of ratings by most agencies when a parent subsidiary link
is in place (Emery and Cantor, 2005). It also identi￿es some characteristics that should be
related to selective defaults. These are the correlation between operating cash-￿ ows, the
size of the a¢ liate relative to the group and the relative risk of its operations.
Last but not least, our paper can provide a basis for studying the default correlation
properties of ￿rm portfolios - and therefore the stability of banks. Our model predicts that
such properties crucially depend on the type of parent-subsidiary link, on the existence
of regulatory constraints on leverage and on the incidence of subsidiaries in the portfolio,
because of size.
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subsidiary rescue, as well as the areas of joint or selective defaults. It can be seen that - if
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27Figure 4: This ￿gure depicts optimal leverage, total asset value, recovery rate and credit
spreads for the three types of parent-subsidiary links, as correlation between activity cash
￿ ows increases.
28Figure 5: This ￿gure depicts the risk-neutral default probability for the three types of
parent-subsidiary links as correlation between activity cash-￿ ows increases.
29Default correlation under different parent-subsidiary links:
symmetric case
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Figure 6: The ￿gure presents the default correlation, i.e. the correlation between the ￿ve-
year default events, for symmetric, unconstrained ￿rms under di⁄erent parent-subsdiary
links: separately incorporated versus group structure.
30Default correlation, constrained case
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Figure 7: The ￿gure presents the default correlation, i.e. the correlation between the ￿ve-
year default events, for symmetric, constrained ￿rms under di⁄erent parent-subsdiary links:
separately incorporated versus group structure.
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